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Abstract: We investigate the level of competition in the Pakistani cement industry using a data 
sample spanning more than a quarter of a century, encompassing both the pre- and the post-reform 
period.   The methodological constraints are addressed through the widely used Bresnahan–Lau , 
Lerner index (LI), and Boone β tests alongside traditional competition indices, such as the 
Herfindahl index, concentration index, and price–cost margins, to test consistent allegations of 
cartel formation and price and quantity supplied manipulations by the producers’ association.  We 
find that producers have in fact managed to maintain a stable share amongst themselves for a long 
period in terms of production capacities and assets, leading, in some cases, to excess capacities.  
The output level has been lower than would have been competitive.  The output prices have 
surpassed the marginal cost consistently over a long period of time, and the industry has operated 
under conditions that are less than fully competitive.  Broadly speaking, we conclude that, contrary 
to expectations, the level of competition in the industry has deteriorated since the reforms.  The 
policy implication of our study is that a significant component of a future reform agenda should be 
the establishment and strengthening of regulatory institutions and the avoidance of regulatory 
capture to keep a consistent check on the working of ex-privatised firms to discourage 
anticompetitive practices.  The nature of an industry such as the cement production industry, in 
which the environment is conducive to cartel formation, should be considered at the onset of the 
government’s reform agenda in developing countries in particular, where institutions are relatively 
weak and less efficient and business lobbies are extremely powerful and politically connected. 
Keywords: Reform; Privatisation; Competitiveness; Collusion; Regulation; Market power; Cement 
industry; Pakistan 
JEL Classifications: D22, K21, L11, L13, L33 
1. Introduction 
One of the benefits of deregulation and privatisation, alongside other advantages, is the belief 
that they will supposedly lead to lower prices for consumers and greater levels of efficiency for 
firms and thus increase competition.  Following this principle, the Pakistani Government introduced 
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a series of reforms in the early and mid-1980s, including price decontrol, easing of import 
restrictions, and encouragement of the private sector to set up production plants in the 
manufacturing sector generally and in the cement industry particularly.  The deregulation policy 
was further supplemented by the introduction of mass privatisation of industrial firms in the early 
and mid-1990s by the then pro-business political government.  Subsequently, during the late 1990s 
and early 2000s, some other broader reforms were introduced, including auditing, disclosure, 
foreign trade, and the strengthening of regulatory authorities to promote competition.  
This study aims to establish whether the privatisation and deregulation policy adopted by the 
Government of Pakistan has made the industry more competitive. We chose the Pakistani cement 
industry for three reasons. Firstly, the potential for forming a cartel in the cement industry is 
relatively high due to the higher sunk cost of setting up a cement manufacturing plant. This 
discourages new firm entry and reduces the competition. Secondly, similar to the cement industry in 
countries such as Brazil, Germany, the USA, Turkey, India, Norway, Poland, and the UK, the 
cement industry in Pakistan has been investigated by regulatory authorities during the last few years 
following allegations of producers forming a cartel and fixing prices and production. Thirdly, there 
is continued international academic interest in the assessment of the competitive conditions in the 
cement industry in particular. This study will contribute to the international debate in the literature 
on the formation of cartels in the cement industry as well as providing some valuable input for the 
regulatory authorities in Pakistan. In the next section, we discuss the relevant work in the area of 
privatisation/deregulation and its effect on competition and then review the state of play in the 
Pakistani cement industry. The subsequent sections then present the theoretical underpinnings and 
methodology. The data sources and the construction of relevant variables are explained, and the 
empirical analysis section deals with the estimation of the different empirical models. The final 
section concludes with a discussion of the results.  
2. Impact of Deregulation and Privatisation on Competition: 
Review of the Literature  
Since the introduction of deregulation and privatisation into financial and non-financial 
sectors, a number of studies have investigated the impact of these reforms on the evolution of 
competition conditions. Yildirim and Mohanty (2010) investigated the effect of deregulation on 
state-level competition in the US banking market over the period 1976–2005. The study concluded 
that US banks in general operated under monopolistic competition during the period examined and 
that the US banking industry has become less competitive due to the rising market power of large-
sized banks as a result of geographic deregulation. Ho (2010) studied the effect of easing regulation 
on the banking industry in Hong Kong. Overall, the author found that deregulation had a positive 
impact whereby the industry became more competitive and that consumers were better off after 
deregulation. Maudos and Solís (2011) focused on the impact of deregulation on determining 
competition in the Mexican banking industry in the period 1993–2005. The empirical evidence 
pointed towards the development of monopolistic competition. The Lerner index showed an 
increase in competition in the loan market but a decrease in the deposit market in the post-reform 
period. The study questioned the effectiveness of the new regulatory regime in relation to 
competition in the industry.  In a cross-country study within the sub-continent, Perera et al. (2006) 
showed that banking profits were earned under conditions of monopolistic competition. The study 
also examined the nature of the banking business and concluded that, in the case of the Pakistani 
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banking industry, fee-earning business was more competitive, while, for Indian banking, interest 
earned on traditional banking activity, such as deposit taking and loan making, was more 
competitive.  
Regarding non-financial industries, Çetin and Benk (2011) evaluated the deregulation effect on 
competition in the Turkish airline industry. The study found that policy had a positive effect on 
competition and had started benefiting customers. Okoeguale (2015) studied the 1996 deregulation 
of the US telecommunication industry and found that deregulation increased merger activity by 
increasing competition, concluding that “deregulation opened both the local and long-distance 
telecom markets to competition from new communication technologies, resulting in significant 
increases in initial public offering (IPO) and merger activity”. Studies examining the level of 
competition in Pakistan have not been so numerous. Most of the studies conducted so far have been 
limited to the financial sector. One of these is the study by Khan (1998), who concluded that there 
was an increase in the level of competition as a result of the reforms introduced in the early 1990s. 
The study also noted that, whilst competition is increasing, it is still limited. In summary, generally 
speaking, studies examining the impact of reforms on competition, including privatisation, are 
relatively limited and studies focusing on the Pakistani manufacturing industry in particular are 
almost non-existent. This study aims to address this gap in the empirical literature and will provide 
a base on which future studies can advance the literature further.    
3. Reforms in the Pakistani Cement Industry 
Since the reforms of the early 1990s, including the deregulation of prices and the transfer of 
ownership from the public to the private sector, there has been a significant shift in the way in 
which firms operate and set prices according to the market conditions. The industry has gained 
significant capacity in the post-reform period. The northern region in particular has experienced a 
significant number of new firms entering the industry. The industry has also witnessed a number of 
mergers and acquisitions. Small-sized, less profitable companies have been bought by larger 
producers. Since 2003, the industry has also started to export cement to neighbouring countries, 
such as India, Afghanistan, Iran, and the UAE. Proponents of the reforms and the free market feel 
that the industry has become very competitive over time and that consumers are obtaining benefits 
through the enhanced consumer surplus and the availability of products all year round, compared 
with the rationing and quotas that existed when the industry was predominantly operating under 
government ownership with heavy regulation.  
However, there have been some serious allegations of collusion and monopoly-forming tactics 
as a result of the establishment of a producer association, the “All Pakistan Cement Manufacturing 
Association” (APCMA). APCMA offices have been raided twice by the Federal Investigative 
Agency (FIA) in the last few years to collect documentary evidence of any written agreements 
between producers in regard to prices or production quantities. One of the regulators, the Monopoly 
Control Authority (now the Competition Commission of Pakistan), carried out a detailed 
assessment of the industry to investigate collusion practices and concluded that it was unable to 
prove that the industry was operating under any sort of cartel or that producers were colluding in 
setting prices or production quotas. Interestingly, no documentary proof of illegal anti-competitive 
practices has been found by the competition authorities or the FIA. However, by looking at the 
concentration ratios (see Table 1), one could conclude that more than 40% of the capacity is owned 
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by the top three firms only, and the remaining 60% is shared among the rest. Even more telling is 
that the top three firms controlled almost 50% of the total assets in 2011. 
Table 1. Concentration ratios of top three firms (CR3) 
 1987 1990 1997 2003 2008 2011 
CR3 of total assets 0.33 0.36 0.42 0.42 0.47 0.48 
CR3 of production capacity 0.38 0.36 0.34 0.33 0.44 0.41 
Source: Own calculation using information from the annual reports of the cement manufacturing firms. 
 
4. Empirical Methodology to Estimate the Competition Levels in 
the Cement Industry  
This study uses a number of widely used traditional competition indices alongside other new 
methods of competition assessment. These include traditional non-parametric simple ratio methods, 
such as the Herfindahl index (H), the top three firms’ market share measured by the concentration 
index (C3), and firms’ mark-up over the marginal cost measured by the price–cost margin (PCM). 
More advanced regression analysis to examine the level of competition in the industry includes the 
estimation of the Bresnahan–Lau , Lerner index (LI), and Boone β.    
4.1 Estimation of the competition index – Bresnahan–Lau  
According to Bresnahan (1982), the first step in the calculation of the competition index   is 
the specification of a demand function representing the true demand curve. For this study, we 
approximate the demand function as: 
                                               
where   is the cement quantity produced and sold,   is the average firm-wise respective price of 
cement sold per tonne (calculated as the total gross sales divided by the total cement quantity sold), 
  captures the demand-enhancing economic activities, such as public sector development 
expenditure as a percentage of the GDP,   is a substitute proxy for cement,1 and e is the error term.   
 
For the supply function, we utilise the translog total cost as follows: 
       
                      
                                  
            
           
            
            
                
                                                                 
                                                                                                                                                            
where     represents the log of the total cost, comprising the production, distribution, and 
administration costs, while                  and      are exogenous input prices (representing 
the log of yearly employee wage rates and the price of furnace oil, electricity, and limestone).  The 
price of packing material is used to impose homogeneity on the input prices. The implied marginal 
cost (  ) function is therefore derived as follows: 
                                               
1 Due to the fact that there is no perfect substitute for cement, we use construction activity. 
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With these two equations (1 and 3) in place,   can be estimated. Importantly, the supply 
function is estimated assuming a degree of market power (and hence influence over price) as:   
   
  
            
 
 
 
                                       
  
    
            
                                                                                         
 
where μ represents the error or residual term while D is a dummy variable to represent the post-
reform period (dummy variable D = 1 for the post-deregulation and privatisation period from 1990 
onward; D = 0 otherwise. Later, we extend the basic model with the introduction of more dummy 
variables by delving deeper into different post-reform periods).    is estimated to represent a 
measure of market power, in which case the value for firms operating under conditions of monopoly 
or collusive oligopoly should be higher than that in more competitive market conditions. 
4.2 Estimation of the Lerner index – the conjectural variation (CV) approach 
In this regard, we follow the methodology developed by Iwata (1974), in which the parameters 
from a firm’s behavioural equation are estimated.  The methodology assumes that all firms seek to 
maximise their profits and determine the market prices and the levels of output based on the costs 
and the degree of competition. Let us say that    represents the output of firm  ,           , and  
         (the output for the entire industry).  The inverse demand function is specified as 
   (   ), where   is a vector of exogenous variables that have some effect on the demand. In 
addition, let               be the cost function for firm  , where    is the vector of the prices of 
inputs employed by firm  . The firm therefore tries to maximise its profit levels by solving the 
following equation:  
                                                              (5) 
where the first-order condition that corresponds to the above is given as: 
    
         
  
  
                                                 (6) 
The conjectural elasticity      of the total industry output with respect to the output of the j-th
 
firm is defined as: 
    
      
    
                                                             (7) 
where    is the market demand semi-elasticity, such as:   
    
     
 
                                                         (8) 
As the objective is to estimate the overall degree of market power within the industry, the 
estimation of the ratio           is sufficient to calculate the learner index.  Dividing lambda by 
the average price in the industry, we obtain Lerner index                     measuring the 
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relative mark-up of price over marginal cost (Appelbaum, 1982).  Equation (6) is estimated 
simultaneously with a total cost function, in which the production technology is assumed to be 
based on five inputs, as mentioned above. We also include time dummies in the cost function to 
capture the economic cycles and time effects. To preserve the degrees of freedom, we use twelve 
time dummies, each one covering two years, while treating the years 1986 and 1987 as the base 
category. Equations (2) and (6) are then estimated, with the latter rewritten as:  
   
 
 
                                      
                  
 
                                                            
where, on the right-hand side of equation (9), the first term reflects the marginal cost and the 
parameters    attached to the time dummy variables appearing in the last summation operator 
capture the potential sources of market power or premium over the marginal cost. Similar to the 
previous exercise, we impose homogeneity of input prices by dividing the input prices and total cost 
by our fifth input price (the price of packing material). Subsequently, regression coefficients are 
used to estimate the marginal cost and the Lerner index.  
4.3 Estimation of the Lerner index – the stochastic frontier (SF) approach  
The total cost function estimation above assumes that firms try to minimise their costs with 
respect to their output and input prices. However, not all firms are likely to achieve this, and this 
could introduce optimisation errors, which should be taken into account when estimating the 
marginal cost and mark-ups. Recently, some authors, such as Kumbhakar, et al. (2012) and 
Coccorese (2014), addressed the optimisation error issue by introducing an error term into the 
regression mode and used the well-established stochastic frontier to estimate the mark-ups. We 
encourage interested readers to consult these two studies for the methodological development and 
the framework of estimation. By using the total cost function of equation (2) and differentiating 
with respect to q, we obtain the following estimable revenue to cost share       equation: 
                                                           
where the price     multiplied by the quantity     yields the total revenues      and the 
ratio       could be interpreted as the revenue to cost share        By using the appropriate 
distributional form of    , we can obtain an index of market power, such as: 
    
  
 
   
     
    
                                                                          
From the above, the traditional Lerner index is estimated by the following
2
: 
      
   
       
                                                                    
4.4 Relative profit: the estimation of Boone β 
Another indicator of competition, proposed by Griffith, et al. (2005) and developed further by 
Boone (2008), is the relative profit, more commonly known as Boone β. The Boone indicator is 
                                               
2 For the algebraic manipulation and detail of the estimation strategy, see Kumbhakar, et al. (2012). 
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considered to be more robust and overcomes many of the issues of traditional competition 
indicators, focusing on the conduct of firms rather than the outcome of the competitive conduct. 
Following Boone (2008), we could characterise the Boone model for firm i at time t as: 
                                                            (13) 
where  it is the variable profit (calculated as revenues – variable cost) for firm i at time t, β is 
referred to as the Boone indicator, and     is the marginal cost. Following Boone (2008), the average 
variable cost could be approximated by the cost of goods sold divided by the net sales (sales net of 
indirect taxes) in place of the marginal cost due to the fact that the marginal cost is not directly 
available and has to be estimated. An increase in the cost reduces the profit generally, but, in a more 
competitive environment, inefficient firms are punished more heavily and their profit should be 
reduced more. Following Schaeck and Cihák (2014), the β indicator could be estimated by the 
following: 
                                
   
    
    
 
    
                           
 
We use the profit and cost in the log form. To normalise with respect to the size of the firm, 
the variable profit       could be expressed as a proportion of assets. T is the total number of 
periods (years); and   are time dummies. Time dummies are interacted with cost (in log form) to 
obtain year-specific estimates. A higher value of β compared with a base period would indicate an 
increase in competition and vice versa. 
5. Data Sources and Traditional Competition Indices  
Panel data reflecting a variety of variables were taken from a number of sources, covering the 
period 1986–2011, and were used to estimate the various competition indices mentioned in the 
methodology section above. The data set used by this study encompasses a much wider time period 
of post-privatisation and deregulation periods than most other such studies on the development of 
competition during post-reform periods. To our knowledge, no similar study focusing on 
developing countries has been able to obtain comprehensive data on a time period of this length. 
Data on the different variables needed to estimate the competition indices mentioned in the 
methodology section for the cement producer firms were obtained from a number of sources, such 
as company annual reports, the Karachi stock exchange, the APCMA, the Competition Commission 
of Pakistan, now abolished, the Expert Advisory Cell (Ministry of Production and Industries, 
Government of Pakistan), brokerage houses in Karachi, company websites, personal contacts, 
authors in the field who had previously obtained such data for use in previous studies, and many 
others. The final working panel data set used in this study comprises information on 21 producer 
firms over a period of 26 years (1986 to 2011). As a preliminary analysis, we start with one of the 
widely used traditional non-parametric measures of competition. The Herfindahl index (H), 
contained in Table 2, suggests no change in the level of competition in the post-reform period. 
A marginal increase in competition immediately after the reforms was offset by a decrease 
during 2007 to 2011. We also experimented by constructing the Herfindahl index using three 
different measures: the total assets, rated capacity, and gross sales volume. The concentration index 
(C3) approximated by the top three firms’ market share also depicts a similar trend (no significant 
change over time). It appears that both index values are not high and hence could suggest that there 
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is less presence of concentration and potential for exercising monopoly power. The stability in the 
index, although indicating little change in the status quo, could conversely suggest that producers 
were negotiating and agreeing on a fixed market share in terms of sales quantity, price, and 
production capacity and subsequently maintaining this throughout the sample period, particularly 
after the early 1990s, when the producer association became very powerful. Interestingly, the third 
measure, the price–cost margin (PCM: weighted as well as unweighted) indicates a decrease in 
competition during the post deregulation and reform period. These initial observations, just based 
on simple ratios and descriptive statistics of the data, are useful, but a more detailed assessment is 
carried out subsequently using parametric methods to estimate another widely used measure of 
competition, the Lerner index and the Boone beta, as discussed in the methodology section. 
Table 2. Estimation of competitive conditions (traditional measures of competition) 
 Herfindahl index C3 PCM WPCM 
1986–87 0.097 0.392 0.556 0.574 
1988–89 0.087 0.350 0.569 0.567 
1990–91 0.085 0.352 0.540 0.553 
1992–93 0.081 0.319 0.587 0.614 
1994–95 0.083 0.328 0.613 0.646 
1996–97 0.072 0.291 0.607 0.629 
1998–99 0.076 0.324 0.581 0.616 
2000–01 0.078 0.352 0.545 0.579 
2002–03 0.074 0.339 0.572 0.605 
2004–05 0.078 0.352 0.582 0.612 
2006–07 0.096 0.424 0.522 0.575 
2009–09 0.104 0.451 0.435 0.492 
2010–11 0.114 0.491 0.381 0.451 
1986–91 0.090 0.365 0.555 0.564 
1992–98 0.077 0.308 0.599 0.626 
1999–06 0.079 0.356 0.571 0.605 
2007–11 0.109 0.467 0.418 0.482 
1992–11 0.086 0.367 0.542 0.582 
     
Notes: H: Herfindahl index (total asset shares), is defined as       
  
    
C3 = concentration ratio based on the market share of the top three firms.  
 Price cost margin (PCM) is defined as      
                    
     
 
WPCM: weighted PCM, where weights are determined by the market shares of total assets.  
 
6. Parametric Estimation of Competition Indices and 
Their Explanation 
Equations (1) and (4) were estimated jointly using the 2SLS non-linear full information 
maximum likelihood method. The results of this can be found in Table 3. Models with different 
specifications were estimated by selecting the time period in which the reforms took effect, such as 
ISSNs: 1923-7529; 1923-8401  © 2019 Academic Research Centre of Canada 
~ 84 ~ 
 
1993: the year immediately after the first phase of privatisation, Subsequently, we portioned the 
reform periods into two sub-periods (first: 1990 to 2003; second: 2004 to 2011) to observe any 
divergence between these two post-reform periods in terms of prices and output. The period 2003–
2007 is also considered to be a period of high GDP and banking credit growth in relation to the 
overall post-reform tenure. Similar to other empirical studies estimating the cost function, we 
imposed homogeneity on the input prices. Our theoretical expectations were generally confirmed.   
Table 3. Maximum likelihood 2SLS estimates of the competition index () and other parameters 
 
Base Model  Reform Effect: 1993  
Reform Effect: 1990–
2003, 2004–11 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5)  (6) (7) 
Parameter Estimate Std Err.  Estimate Std Err.  Estimate Std Err. 
   
  Demand Equation (1) 
   1.749435
**
 0.5805  1.403855
**
 0.63430  2.671119
***
 0.706 
   ---
0.000720*** 
0.00011
7 
 -0.00064
***
 0.000123  -0.00096
**
 0.000123 
   0. 0028
**
 9.07E-06  0.000034
***
 9.97E-06  0.000018
*
 0.000011 
   0.000051
***
 3.47E-06  0.000049
***
 3.58E-06  0.00006
***
 3.71E-06 
   -0.21911
***
 0.0274  -0.20928
***
 0.02840  -0.26178
***
 0.0297 
   -5.87E-09
***
 1.74E-09  -7.1E-09
***
 1.82E-09  -3.40E-09
**
 1.76E-09 
   3.70E-07 5.94E-07  3.07E-07 6.05E-07  5.20E-07 6.53E-07 
   0.329778 0.2306  0.348286 0.2313  0.428773 0.2602 
         
  Supply Equation (4) 
 0.020397
**
 0.0107  0.145747
**
 0.0576  0.263543
***
 0.0774 
   3.550252
***
 0.2784  3.825612
***
 0.3550  4.52352
***
 0.4525 
   0.226618
***
 0.00904  0.230195
***
 0.0101  0.229457
***
 0.011 
   -0.11298
***
 0.0267  -0.14641
***
 0.0305  -0.22108
***
 0.0386 
   -0.12159
*
 0.0652  -0.20377
**
 0.0805  -0.14194
**
 0.0706 
   0.075506 0.0764  0.11866 0.0813  0.046675 0.0888 
   -0.14301
***
 0.0333  -0.16479
***
 0.0409  -0.15248
**
 0.0497 
dereg    -0.12839
**
 0.0577  0.27979
***
 0.0571 
dereg1       -0.23307
**
 0.0768 
Adj. R
2
  0.3423 
0.4493 
 0.3456 
0.4323 
 0.2931 
0.3287 R
2
   
Notes:  *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the level of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
 
Starting with our base model (columns 2 and 3 in Table 3), overall, the statistical model fits 
the data very well given the fact that we are using disaggregated individual firm-level data over a 
very long time period; twelve of the fifteen coefficients are statistically significant and the λ is 
estimated at 0.02, with a standard error of 0.01. This indicates a statistically significant index of 
competition and overall some market power. As the coefficient is statistically different from zero, 
we can reject the null hypothesis that the cement industry operated under conditions of perfect 
competition. Interestingly, though, as the λ value is much closer to zero than to one, we can be 
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fairly certain that firms were not operating under the conditions of pure monopoly. Nonetheless, the 
very low value of the index means that we can conclude that the competitive conditions were not 
completely imperfect and the industry did operate relatively competitively over the whole sample 
period. This result is consistent with the APCMA version and the conclusions of the Competition 
Commission of Pakistan.  
Next, we re-estimated the above model by introducing a shift dummy, similarly to Gruben and 
McComb (2003), to indicate any divergence from competitive conditions in the post-deregulation 
and privatisation period. An indication of a statistically significant positive λ in the post-
deregulation period would indicate divergence from competitive conditions. We included a dummy 
variable equal to 1 for the period 1993 onwards and 0 otherwise. The results of this exercise are 
reported in Table 3 (columns 4 and 5). Similar to the above, the model fits the data well, with only 
three coefficients being insignificant. The substitute variable coefficient, though it has the wrong 
sign, is significant. Our point of interest variables λ and λdereg are both significant. The positive λ 
indicates that the industry was operating under a competitive structure with some market power 
before privatisation. The negative λ in the post-1993 period is an indication of excess capacity 
compared with what was determined by the marginal revenues and marginal cost (marginal cost 
exceeding marginal revenue).  
This is not a surprising result given the fact that the financial performance of these privatised 
companies in particular, and the industry generally, was not encouraging in the post-privatisation 
period (we discuss this in the latter part of this section). Combining λ and λdereg, we determined 
where some market power was being exercised by these firms (similar to the base model). The 
value of -λdereg > 0 is also an indication that, for some reason, producers were producing and 
supplying greater output than the competitive level. The added capacities had perhaps exerted extra 
pressure on suppliers to produce more to meet the interest payments on funds borrowed from banks 
and other financial institutions. To explore this finding further, we re-estimated the model, 
introducing two shift dummy variables for two post-reform periods: a dummy variable equal to 1 
for the period 1990–2003 and 0 otherwise and another dummy variable equal to 1 for the period 
2004–2011 and 0 otherwise. This exercise was carried out to identify any changes in competitive 
conditions between the two separate periods, that is, immediately after the reforms (the first 10 
years of the reform period) and then in subsequent years.  
The λ value in this formulation is positive and statistically significant (columns 6 and 7). The 
first shift dummy in this case (λdereg) captures the period 1990–2003 and indicates a significant 
decrease in competition, and the coefficient is statistically different from zero. The second shift 
interactive term (λdereg1) suggests a degree of excess capacity over the period 2004 onwards and is 
statistically significant.  This seems to indicate that, in the latter part of the reform period, there 
were significant capacity additions, which forced firms to operate at a higher output level than the 
competitive levels. Interestingly, a significant part of this output was exported to neighbouring 
countries. The sum of λ and the interactive shift coefficient (λdereg and λdereg1) provides a degree 
of post-1990 percentage deviation of aggregate output from the competitive equilibrium level 
regardless of the functional form of demand and supply (Shaffar, 1993, page 58, footnote 9). This 
figure is 31% less than the competitive level. Overall, our final model (estimates presented in 
columns 6 and 7) indicates a decrease in competitive conditions and thus shows that the industry 
had started to move away from the perfect conditions but of course far away from complete 
monopoly. 
ISSNs: 1923-7529; 1923-8401  © 2019 Academic Research Centre of Canada 
~ 86 ~ 
 
Table 4 displays the average costs alongside the marginal costs using the regression coefficient 
of the CV approach. Some interesting trends can be identified.  Firstly, by looking at the average 
and marginal costs, it can be seen that the cost of producing cement has declined continuously since 
the mid-1990s. Interestingly, the average prices during the sample period remained roughly the 
same, with the exception of the period 1994 to 1999, when the prices declined from 4500 to 3900 
per tonne. This could be explained by the fact that firms were using more advanced technology (dry 
process) as well as developments in competitive conditions. Hence, the reduction in cost has not 
been passed on to consumers. It also appears that, ignoring their magnitude, the Lerner indices have 
been rising since the time when deregulation and privatisation were implemented, irrespective of 
the index estimated by the CV or stochastic frontier techniques. Therefore, firms as a whole have 
charged above marginal costs since the reforms commenced. In particular, since 1999, the increase 
in the Lerner index (decrease in competition) has been steep. This is interesting given the fact that 
the decrease in marginal costs has not been passed on to consumers. The Boone beta index is 
considered to be more robust than the Lerner index, and this also produces similar findings. One 
criticism of the Boone beta index is the assumption of constant marginal costs (average variable 
cost) with respect to a change in output. As a robustness check, we used the marginal costs derived 
from the CV model and recalculated the Boone beta for the pre- and post-deregulation/privatisation 
periods. Our beta coefficient values were 0.974 for 1986–91, 0.703 for 1992–98, 0.655 for 1999–
2011, 0.492 for 1999–2006, and 0.686 for 1992–2011. Therefore, ignoring the magnitude of the 
coefficients, the conclusion seems to be the same: the competition levels have decreased over time. 
Table 4. Estimation of competitive conditions (other indices) 
 LI  
(CV) 
LI 
(SF ) 
Boone β 
(2005) 
MC AC 
ROA 
(%) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1988–89 0.347 0.135 3.327 3339 3623 8.813 
1990–91 0.297 0.139 2.384 3470 3685 3.833 
1992–93 0.356 0.138 1.810 3151 3334 9.448 
1994–95 0.343 0.132 1.123 3348 3793 10.604 
1996–97 0.418 0.149 2.724 2253 2611 -1.073 
1998–99 0.367 0.166 2.437 2273 2704 -5.122 
2000–01 0.427 0.176 2.315 2326 2677 -1.851 
2002–03 0.452 0.185 2.233 2198 2497 0.149 
2004–05 0.518 0.188 1.545 1891 2162 8.965 
2006–07 0.443 0.184 1.316 2049 2252 5.367 
2009–09 0.447 0.193 2.003 2330 2550 -0.859 
2010–11 0.532 0.210 1.656 1794 2005 -1.796 
1986–91 0.322 0.137 2.856 3405 3654 6.323 
1992–98 0.371 0.146 2.023 2756 3110 3.464 
1999–06 0.441 0.180 1.969 2147 2458 1.502 
2007–11 0.474 0.196 1.658 2058 2269 0.904 
1992–11 0.430 0.172 1.916 2361 2658 2.383 
Notes: LI (CV) =     . λ is estimated using a system of two simultaneous equations with the three-stage least-
square (3SLS) method. LI (SF) = the Lerner index based on the stochastic frontier and calculated using the 
formula LI = θ/(1+ θ). Griffith et al.’s (2005) β is calculated by regressing the cost ratio (cost of goods sold 
(cogs) to net sales) on profit (net sales – cogs). Both variables are in log forms. The Arellano–Bond dynamic 
panel data estimation method is used by interacting yearly time dummies with the cost ratio. Time dummies 
are also included as independent variables. A one-year lag of profit is included as a regressor to account for 
Review of Economics & Finance, Volume 16,  Issue 2 
~ 87 ~ 
 
the dynamic effects. This is similar to Schaeck and Cihák (2014). MC = marginal cost estimated by regression 
and AC = average total cost, calculated by dividing the total cost by the total cement dispatched. ROA = 
return on assets (%), calculated by dividing the net profit after taxes by the total assets.   
  
Table 4 above depicts the industry profitability measured through the return on assets (ROA). 
Since 1995, with the exception of 2004 to 2006, the profitability has been declining and firms have 
earned smaller margins on investments. The ROA is the net return on assets after deducting all 
government levies and taxes (directly and indirectly). An increase in the government share of the 
total pie could leave a smaller residual to be distributed/kept for shareholders. Table 5 shows the tax 
payments of the industry during the sample period. It is apparent from the numbers that the 
Government has been the main beneficiary, as tax receipts to the Government have been rising 
since 1992. 
Table 5. Total government taxes paid by the cement producers (rupees in billions) 
Years Sales tax Excise duty Others Corporate tax Total 
1986–1991 3.25 12.26 2.06 0.74 18.3 
1992–1996 10.82 21.92 0.85 3.11 36.67 
1992–2001 18.12 74.59 0.96 3.84 97.47 
1992–2011 96.94 219.02 1.60 12.63 330.15 
7. Conclusion 
This paper sought to test for the presence of competition in the Pakistani cement industry over 
the period 1986 to 2011.  The Bresnahan–Lau , Lerner index, and other non-parametric indices 
were estimated to determine the market power of the average firm when the market is in Cournot 
equilibrium. Based on different competition measures, one gains the impression that the 
deregulation and privatisation measures introduced by the Government in the early 1990s have 
made the industry relatively less competitive over time, and there are signs of firms gaining market 
power. The implication of this finding is that, similar to other countries, empirical evidence in 
relation to completion increasing after reforms does not exist. The role of regulatory bodies to 
enforce the competition laws needed to be strengthened. The Government’s focus, perhaps 
subsequent to the reforms, has been the maximisation of tax receipts from the industry, as the 
payments to the Government in the form of direct and indirect taxes have been significant and have 
kept increasing over time. There is an urgent need for the government authorities in general and for 
regulatory authorities in particular to investigate the industry cost and pricing policies more 
rigorously and develop ways to rationalise government tax collection so that consumers can benefit 
from the reform policy in terms of a reduction in prices alongside the year-round availability of 
cement in the country. The long-term survival of the industry also depends on reasonable 
profitability and better competitive conditions to avoid the hit-and-run policy of new producers. 
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